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Abstract 
We study the effect of product market volatility on a firm’s choice between 
multiskilling and specialization. We construct a theoretical model that captures the 
tradeoff between multiskilling (which gives greater flexibility to reassign workers in 
production) and specialization (which provides workers with the expertise to 
respond to product market signals in their area of specialty). Using data from the 
2004 WERS, a nationally-representative cross section of British establishments, we 
find that greater volatility is associated with greater specialization. This result holds 
both inside and outside of manufacturing, but consistent with our model, it holds 
only in multi-product establishments and not in single-product ones. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 A fundamental question in job design is whether employers should have 
workers specialize in certain tasks or whether workers should be multiskilled so 
that they are able to perform multiple tasks. Two broad perspectives might be taken 
concerning the benefits of multiskilling relative to specialization. The first, which we 
refer to as the “flexibility perspective,” is that a key advantage of multiskilling 
relative to specialization is flexibility in labor allocation. That is, if workers are 
multiskilled, they are able to switch quickly from one task to another in response to 
changing production requirements or product demand. The second, which we refer 
to as the “productivity perspective,” concerns the benefits of specialization that have 
been well known since Smith (1776). That is, specialized workers, either due to 
more intensive training or due to more focused learning-by-doing, are more skilled 
at the task they are specialized in than are workers whose training and labor are 
spread across multiple tasks. This suggests that specialized workers will have 
deeper knowledge of a given task and will be more productive at it than will 
multiskilled workers, who are “jacks of all trades and masters of none.”1  
In this paper we explore, theoretically and empirically, how the relative 
benefits of multiskilling versus specialization change when the market for a multi-
product firm’s products (or services) becomes more volatile. We argue that as 
product market volatility increases, so does the importance of being able to 
innovate—to adjust product specifications in response to changing market 
conditions.2 Since workers specialized in one good know their product better than 
multiskilled workers, whose training is spread across multiple goods, specialists 
have a productivity advantage in their greater ability to adapt their product to 
changing market conditions. Therefore, we argue that as product market volatility, 
                                                        
1 The “jack of all trades, master of none” notion that it is rare for someone who is excellent in one 
activity to be excellent in another is quite intuitive. A formal argument establishing the result can be 
found in Lazear (1998), pp. 469 – 473. 
2 Changing product specifications can occur in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing contexts, 
and can involve formal product changes (e.g. those involving creation of a new model of the product) 
or tailoring a good or service to a particular client need. For example, a lawyer specializing in divorce 
law is likely to be more capable than a generalist lawyer of crafting an innovative negotiation 
strategy on behalf of her client. 
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and hence the need for innovation, increases, so does the importance of the 
productivity perspective relative to the flexibility perspective. This in turn implies 
that as volatility rises, firms will engage in less multiskilling and more specialization.  
We present a simple theoretical model that incorporates both the flexibility 
and productivity perspectives and illustrates the tradeoffs between multiskilling 
and specialization. We demonstrate that for most plausible parameter values, firms 
decrease multiskilling as product market volatility rises. Then, in an empirical 
analysis of a large, nationally-representative cross section of British employers, we 
present evidence consistent with our theoretical model that product market 
volatility is, on average, associated with a lower degree of multiskilling. Also 
consistent with our theoretical model, we find that this result holds for multi-
product firms but not for single-product firms.  
Additionally, we show that the result holds both inside and outside of 
manufacturing. The fact that the result holds strongly outside of manufacturing is 
interesting. While the job design literature has focused heavily on manufacturing, 
that sector has declined in recent decades, and less than 13 percent of the 
establishments in our 2004 sample are in manufacturing. Given the trends in the 
modern economy, we see it as important for the job design literature to move 
beyond a narrow focus on the manufacturing sector, and our paper is a step in that 
direction.  
The idea of innovation used in this paper warrants a brief discussion. We 
argue that specialized workers have a productivity advantage over multiskilled 
workers because their expert knowledge of a given product makes them better at 
adapting that product to changing consumer demand. This adaptation, or product 
innovation, can take the form of changing the product in small ways or large. And 
the adaptation can be done either at the instruction of a manager—in which case the 
specialist’s expertise makes her more capable of implementing the manager’s 
instructions—or the adaptation can be instigated by the worker herself, as in the 
case of delegated authority. 
In assuming that specialists have superior innovation skills, we are implicitly 
distinguishing between product innovation (the adaptation of a product in response 
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to changing market signals), and process innovation (such as occurs when workers 
suggest cost-cutting measures—for instance in the case of continuous process 
improvement). We argue that specialists are better at product innovation, while 
multiskilled workers are likely better at process innovation (this latter point has 
been suggested by various authors, including Koike (1985), Aoki (1986), and Morita 
(2005)). Our data explicitly address product market volatility, so our use of the term 
innovation throughout this paper will refer to product innovation. We discuss this 
distinction further in Section IV. 
Our model concerns the training decision of a two-product firm operating 
over two periods and employing two ex ante identical workers. Product market 
volatility comes in the form of changing consumer demand for product 
specifications, which requires innovation by the firm’s workers and which may lead 
the firm to want to reallocate labor as relative profitability of the goods changes. In 
the first period workers can both be trained to produce both goods (i.e. multiskilled) 
or one can be trained to produce one good and the other to produce the other good 
(i.e. specialized). In the second period, the firm learns the latest product 
specifications demanded by consumers for each of the two goods it produces. The 
firm’s workers must innovate to meet these latest specifications. Multiskilled labor 
can innovate up to a point. However, if the specifications demanded by consumers 
require an extremely high level of innovation, only workers specialized in that good 
can perform the necessary innovation. This means that a firm that multiskills its 
labor force risks being unable to produce one or both goods, if the level of 
innovation required is extremely high. On the other hand, if the level of innovation 
required of the firm’s workers is such that it is feasible to produce both goods, the 
firm then has the flexibility to assign both multiskillled workers to the more 
profitable good. In our model, which assumes a degree of product differentiation, 
firms offering more innovative goods can charge a premium for their innovation. 
Hence more innovative goods are more profitable. 
An example of how a firm’s choice of multiskilling versus specialization can 
be affected by product market volatility will serve to make these ideas more 
concrete. Consider a firm that provides business consulting services. Suppose that it 
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provides clients with services in two areas of business consulting—management 
strategy and human resources consulting. This firm could train all its workers to do 
both management strategy and human resources consulting (hence multiskilling its 
workforce), or it could specialize workers in each area. Suppose that ex ante, the 
expected profitability of each consulting area is equal, but ex post, one area will turn 
out to have consumers who demand particularly innovative solutions and are 
willing to reward such innovation with a higher price. 
In a relatively stable product market, the degree of innovation required by 
clients is not likely to be particularly high, ex post, and the expected difference in ex 
post profitability between services offered will be small. Hence the return to 
innovation will be low, as will the return to flexibility in labor allocation.  
If product market volatility rises, uncertainty about client needs rises. The 
possibility of clients demanding highly innovative services increases, thus raising 
the return to specialized workers. On the other hand, relative differences in ex post 
profitability of the firm’s services also rise, thus raising the return to flexibility in 
labor allocation. Similar examples are found in a diverse range of employment 
settings, from manufacturing to services, where employers face a tradeoff in their 
choice of training mix between the flexibility advantage of multiskilled workers and 
the productivity advantage of specialists. In our model, for most plausible parameter 
values, the return to innovation rises faster than the return to flexibility. As a result 
the productivity perspective on multiskilling dominates—that is, as product market 
volatility rises, firms tend to choose specialization over multiskilling. The theoretical 
prediction is confirmed by our empirical results. 
 The key theoretical contributions of our paper are 1) examining the role of 
product market volatility in the firm’s decision to multiskill workers, which has not 
been addressed in the literature to date; 2) highlighting productivity gains from 
specialization, which have been underemphasized in the literature on multiskilling; 
3) highlighting gains from multiskilling in the form of flexible labor allocation, which 
have also been underemphasized in the literature; and 4) drawing a link between 
specialization and increased product innovation by workers. 
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The key empirical contributions of our paper are 1) testing a new theory of 
multiskilling and providing empirical results consistent with that model and with 
the existing theoretical literature; 2) introducing a new stylized fact to the job 
design literature—that higher levels of product market volatility are associated with 
less multiskilling in multi-product establishments; and 3) providing empirical 
results that, because they are based on a nationally-representative sample of 
establishments in Britain, can be demonstrated to be applicable across sectors and 
firm sizes. Thus, our paper contributes to the broadening of the empirical job design 
literature beyond manufacturing, a sector that has long been in relative decline in 
most developed economies.  
Following the presentation of our main empirical results, in Section IV we 
discuss how our findings relate to the existing literature on multiskilling. We note 
some novel theoretical predictions that result from synthesizing our findings with 
the existing literature and test two of these predictions empirically. In particular, we 
integrate our theory with that of Morita’s (2005) paper on continuous process 
improvement, providing empirical tests of both integrative extensions. 
 
II. A THEORETICAL MODEL 
One perspective is that multiskilling allows firms to flexibly reallocate labor 
in response to changing demand conditions. We refer to this as the “flexibility 
perspective.” Another perspective is that specialization gives workers deep 
expertise that enables them to innovate and rapidly tailor products and services to 
the changing specifications demanded by consumers. This ability to innovate, 
deriving from intensively specializing in one area, is lacking in multiskilled workers 
who are “jacks of all trades and masters of none.” We refer to this second 
perspective as the “productivity perspective.” We now present a model that 
incorporates both perspectives and describes how their relative importance, and 
the firm’s decision to multiskill or specialize its workers, changes when the degree 
of product market volatility increases. 
Consider a firm that has two tasks (A and B) which we shall think of as 
separate products or services. The firm employs two ex ante identical workers. The 
 6 
model consists of two periods. We assume that product differentiation is the source 
of at least some degree of market power in the product market.  
In the first period, the employer makes training decisions (i.e. deciding 
whether each worker will be trained on a separate product or whether they will 
both be trained on both products) without knowledge of what the specifications will 
be of the products/services demanded in the next period. The employer must pay a 
per-worker training cost of c to train a worker. A worker’s training can be spread 
across both products, in which case we refer to the worker as multiskilled. Or the 
training can be focused entirely on one product, in which case we refer to the 
worker as a specialist.3 
In a relatively stable product market, product specifications demanded by 
consumers will not change dramatically from one period to the next, so relatively 
low levels of innovation will be required from the firm’s workers in the second 
period. But in a volatile product market, product specifications demanded by 
consumers can change dramatically. In these instances, a considerable level of 
worker innovation is needed in the second period to execute production to meet the 
specifications demanded by consumers. The firm knows that if it can successfully 
meet the product specifications it will be able to charge a higher price to consumers, 
whereas if it cannot tailor the product so as to meet demand it will be unable to sell 
at all. 
 In the second period, the employer observes the specifications at which 
products are demanded and can allocate labor accordingly to products A and B. 
Workers can only produce a product if they were trained on it in the previous 
period. When making first-period training decisions, the employer observes the 
distribution from which the degree of “innovation required to meet the demanded 
product specifications” is drawn. We normalize to zero the average degree of 
innovation required. Thus, positive realizations reflect a greater-than-average level 
                                                        
3 In practice, training costs might be higher for multi-skilled workers than for specialized workers 
given that they must be trained on both products. We assume equal training costs to emphasize the 
point that, for a given amount (and cost) of training, specialists in a product will have higher 
expected productivity than multiskilled workers in that product, as a consequence of their more 
intensive focus on that product.   
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of innovation required, and negative realizations reflect a smaller-than-average 
level. Henceforth, we refer to a draw from this distribution as the “degree of 
innovation required”, where it is understood that this degree is “relative to the 
average.” The two realizations (one for each product) from this distribution are 
independent and are observed at the start of the second period. Let the degree of 
innovation required be denoted Ij for product j, which is distributed uniformly on  
[-α, α], where 0 < α ≤ p, and p is the baseline, or expected, price of product j when the 
average level of innovation is required. An increase in α is interpreted as an increase 
in the degree of product market volatility.  
If the innovation realization is negative then the firm charges less for the 
product, whereas when the realization is positive, the firm charges more as long as 
it is able to meet the specifications. If the degree of innovation required is 
sufficiently high (i.e. above a critical threshold, k, where 0 ≤ k ≤ α) then multiskilled 
labor is unable to produce the good at all, meaning the firm can produce and sell it 
only if there are specialized workers. Only specialized workers, with their deep 
expertise, possess sufficiently high innovation to enable them to meet demand in 
these instances, and when that happens, the firm can charge a higher price for the 
product. Product prices are given by pj = p + Ij, meaning both prices are distributed 
independently and uniformly on [p – α, p + α] with expected price of p for each 
product. Since the product prices are i.i.d., there is no reason for the employer to 
prefer one product over the other when making first-period training decisions. 
Thus, if specialization is chosen, then one worker will be trained on product A and 
the other on product B. Once trained on a particular product, an individual worker’s 
productivity on that product is V, unless the worker is multiskilled and the degree of 
innovation required exceeds k, in which case productivity is zero.  
The employer is pre-committed to paying a fixed wage, w, to all workers in 
the second period, regardless of whether they are multiskilled or specialized, 
regardless of what they produce, and regardless of whether second-period revenue 
is large enough to offset the wage bill. This gives rise to the possibility that realized 
second-period profit can be negative for sufficiently low realizations of prices. The 
assumption is made for simplicity and is not essential for the results. 
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 The key tradeoff the employer faces when making first-period training 
decisions is flexibility versus productivity. If both workers are multiskilled, then if 
the realized price of product A is higher than the realized price of product B, both 
workers can be assigned to product A, and vice versa, so long as extremely high 
levels of innovation (i.e. Ij > k) are not required. In contrast, if the workers are 
specialized, then only one worker is trained to produce the product for which the 
realized price is higher. So in the multiskilling case, in the second period both 
workers can, in many cases, be assigned to the product for which the realized price 
is higher. The downside to multiskilling is that, given that workers are trained on 
both products, they become “jacks of all trades and masters of none.” For levels of 
required innovation in the “normal” range (i.e. Ij < k) this is not a problem. But with 
some probability, market demand will be such that a very high degree of innovation 
is required to tailor product specifications to consumer tastes, and in those cases, 
only specialized labor possesses the skills needed to produce. Thus, the risk that the 
employer runs by choosing multiskilling is that very high levels of innovation will be 
required on one or both of the products. If high innovation is required on one 
product, then both multiskilled workers will (out of necessity) be assigned to the 
other product. If high innovation is required on both products, then a firm in which 
both workers are multiskilled cannot produce at all. In contrast, specialized workers 
can always produce the product they are trained on, regardless of the required level 
of innovation.   
Let πS and πM denote the employer’s profit given that its workers are 
specialized and multiskilled, respectively. Expected profit from specialization is: 
E(πS) = 2(pV – c – w). Let θ = Prob(pA > p + k) = Prob(pB > p + k) = (α – k)/2α. 
Expected profit from multiskilling is:  
E(πM) = 2θ(1 – θ)(2p + k – α)V + (1 – θ)22[p + (2k – α)/3]V – 2c – 2w  
where p + (2k – α)/3 is E(max[pA,pB] | pA ≤ p + k, pB ≤ p + k), or the expected value of 
the second order statistic based on two draws from the uniform distribution on [p – 
α, p + k]. We assume that V is large enough so that max[E(πM),E(πS)] > 0, which 
guarantees that the firm operates. Then the employer chooses multiskilling when 
making first-period training decisions if E(πM) > E(πS), which reduces to: 
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(1) f(α) ≡ θ(1 – θ)(2p + k – α) + (1 – θ)2[p + (2k – α)/3] – p  > 0  
Letting fα and fαk denote ∂f/∂α and ∂2f/∂α∂k, the main result is:   
Proposition 1:    
i) If k = 0, the firm chooses specialization ∀α.  
ii) If k = α, the firm chooses multiskilling ∀α.     
iii) If k ϵ (0,α), then fα < 0 and fαk < 0. Furthermore, if f(p) < 0 there exists α’ in (k,p) 
such that the firm chooses multiskilling if α < α’, the firm chooses specialization if α 
> α’, and dα’/dk > 0.  
 
Proof: If k = 0, (1) never holds, establishing point i). If k = α, (1) always holds, 
establishing point ii). The first sentence of point iii) follows from  
fα = (3pk2 + k3 – 3αk2 – 2α3 – 3pαk)/(6α3) < 0 and fαk = (6pk + 3k2 – 6αk – 3pα)/(6α3) 
< 0. Given that f(k) = k/3 > 0 and that f(p) can be shown to be negative if p is 
sufficiently large relative to k, the existence of α’ when f(p) < 0 follows from the 
intermediate value theorem, where α’ is defined by  f(α’) = 0. Applying implicit 
differentiation to f(α’) = 0 establishes dα’/dk > 0.  Q.E.D. 
The parameter k captures the relative importance of the productivity 
perspective versus the flexibility perspective. When k = 0, the productivity 
perspective is at maximal importance, since specialized workers are needed to 
produce even when the level of required innovation is only slightly above average. 
Given that multiskilled labor is unable to produce at all for any above-average levels 
of required innovation, the firm never multiskills its workers, regardless of α. At the 
other extreme, when k = α, the productivity perspective vanishes from the model, 
since there exists no level of required innovation beyond which specialized workers 
would have a productivity advantage over multiskilled workers.4 Point iii) of the 
                                                        
4 Note that under an alternative assumption that per-worker training costs are higher for multiskilled 
workers than for specialists, the firm would hire specialists in this case for sufficiently small α and 
would otherwise hire multiskilled labor. Intuitively, the reason why the firm’s likelihood of 
multiskilling in this case would be increasing in α is that the advantage to the firm of being able to 
allocate all of its labor to the more profitable good is increasing in the expected profitability of the 
most profitable good (i.e. the expected value of the maximum order statistic is increasing in the 
variance of the underlying distribution), and this advantage would ultimately overwhelm the higher 
training costs for multi-skilled workers. 
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proposition shows that the firm’s propensity to multiskill its workers is decreasing 
in the degree of product market volatility, which is the main result of the paper. The 
threshold α’ increases with k, because increases in k diminish the importance of the 
productivity perspective, thereby expanding the range of values of product market 
volatility over which the firm finds it profitable to choose multiskilling. 
The theoretical model characterizes the problem facing a single employer.  
To apply the model to analyze a cross section of employers, we incorporate 
establishment-level heterogeneity by attaching a subscript i to the parameters of the 
theoretical model, where i indexes establishments. Then, we can rewrite (1) as: 
(2) f(αi) ≡ θi(1 – θi)(2pi + ki – αi) + (1 – θi)2[pi + (2ki – αi)/3] – pi  > 0          
Next, approximating f(αi) by the latent index yi* ≡ Xiβ – εi, where Xi is a vector of 
observed employer characteristics (including a proxy for αi, measuring the degree of 
product market volatility faced by establishment i), β is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated, and εi is a random variable with the standard normal distribution, we 
have the following probit model: 
Prob(yi = 1) = Prob(yi* > 0) = Ф(Xiβ)  
Prob(yi = 0) = Prob(yi* ≤ 0) = 1 – Ф(Xiβ) 
where Ф denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and yi is a 
binary indicator equaling 1 if establishment i chooses multiskilling and 0 if 
establishment i chooses specialization. 
 The primary question we address in our analysis is how the employer’s 
multiskilling-versus-specialization decision varies with volatility in the product 
market. The statistic of interest is, therefore, the average value of the marginal effect 
∂Ф(Xiβ)/∂αi across all sample observations in the cross section. From Proposition 1, 
we would expect a negative sign on this statistic. With the exception of a small group 
of workers in “skilled metal and electrical trades”, this is in fact the case, as we show 
empirically in the following section.5 
 
 
                                                        
5 Our empirical analysis is based on ordered probit models, rather than binary probit models, since 
the “multiskilling” dependent variable is an ordered discrete response with seven categories. 
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III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Our data source is the management questionnaire from the 2004 British 
Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS), jointly sponsored by the 
Department of Trade and Industry, the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service, the Economic and Social Research Council, and the Policy Studies Institute. 
Distributed via the UK Data Archive in November 2005, the WERS data are a 
nationally representative stratified random sample covering British workplaces 
with at least 5 to 9 employees, except for local units in Northern Ireland and those in 
the following 2003 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) divisions: agriculture, 
hunting, and forestry; fishing; mining and quarrying; private households with 
employed persons; and extra-territorial organizations. The 2004 WERS was the fifth 
such survey, following earlier waves in 1980, 1984, 1990, and 1998. The sampling 
frame used for WERS 2004 is the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR) 
which is maintained by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). As noted by Chaplin 
et al. (2005), “The IDBR is undoubtedly the highest quality sample frame of 
organisations and establishments in Britain. The frame is continuously up-dated 
from [administrative tax] records and establishments that no longer exist are 
removed reasonably quickly.” 
 Our measure of multiskilling is the answer to the following question: 
“Approximately, what proportion of [workers in the establishment’s largest 
occupational group] are formally trained to be able to do jobs other than their own?” 
From this we define the following discrete response variable: 
 
Multiskilling = 1 if “None (0%)” 
           = 2 if “Just a few (1-19%)” 
           = 3 if “Some (20-39%)” 
           = 4 if “Around half (40-59%)” 
           = 5 if “Most (60-79%)” 
           = 6 if “Almost all (80-99%)” 
           = 7 if “All (100%)” 
The distribution of responses for Multiskilling is displayed in Figure 1. 
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The following binary measure captures volatility in the product market: 
 
Volatility = 1 if the current state of the market for the main product or service of the 
establishment is described as “turbulent” (= 0 otherwise)6 
 
Note that the volatility measure allows for volatility in services as well as products. 
A limitation of the measure is that it permits a diversity of interpretations of 
“turbulence”, including interpretations that might differ from the notion of volatility 
in our theoretical model.  
An alternative interpretation of product market volatility could be one of 
volatility in the quantity of goods demanded from the firm by its customers. This 
differs from volatility in the specifications of the product demanded by its 
customers, which is the notion of volatility in our theoretical model. A firm facing 
the first type of volatility (quantity volatility) is uncertain how much it will have to 
produce in the future. A firm facing the second type of volatility (product 
specification volatility) is uncertain what the goods it produces will look like in the 
future.  
Throughout our analysis, we assume that firms reporting product market 
volatility may be experiencing either or both forms of volatility but that, on average, 
product specification volatility (the form of volatility that we model) is an important 
dimension of product market volatility reported by firms in our data. In part, we 
assume this because the data on volatility that we use are derived from a question in 
which the interviewee is asked whether her firm’s product market is presently 
growing, mature, declining, or turbulent. We denote firms facing a “turbulent” 
product market as experiencing product market volatility. Since interviewees are 
likely to interpret “growing” and “declining” as referring largely to quantity, it seems 
likely that “turbulent” captures other aspects of product market conditions, 
including product specification volatility, to a significant degree. Note that even if 
the notion of product market volatility in our data differs somewhat from the notion 
                                                        
6 Other possible responses were “growing”, “mature”, or “declining.” 
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in our theoretical model, this should simply make the empirical finding more 
difficult to discern. 
Descriptive statistics for all variables in the analysis are displayed in Table 1; 
we use establishment sampling weights when computing the statistics in this table 
and in all of our subsequent analyses. Some of the variables contain missing values, 
and we estimate all of our models using listwise deletion.7 Our analyses include 
controls for industry and employer characteristics, defined in the appendix.  
 We start with analysis based on the full sample and then show how our main 
result is significantly sharpened by some subsequent refinements of the analysis 
sample. The first column of Table 2 displays coefficients from an ordered probit 
model using Multiskilling as the dependent variable, with the incremental effects of 
an increase of Volatility from 0 to 1 appearing in the lower portion of the table. The 
main result is that, controlling for establishment characteristics, higher volatility in 
the product market is associated with a lower probability of multiskilling (and 
therefore a higher probability of specialization). This result is consistent with the 
main case of 0<k<α in the theoretical model of Section II. The result is quantitatively 
significant but estimated with modest precision. More specifically, the incremental 
effect of an increase in Volatility from 0 to 1 is associated with an increase of 7.5 
percentage points in the probability that no multiskilling is used in the 
establishment’s largest occupational group. The base probability that no 
multiskilling is used is 0.40, so 7.5 percentage points represents an increase of 19 
percent in the probability that no multiskilling is used. The z-statistic associated 
with this incremental effect is 1.53, so it is statistically significant at the ten percent 
level for a one-tailed test.  
 Further analysis reveals that the relationship between volatility and 
multiskilling is reversed for a small set of establishments for which the largest 
occupational group is the two-digit category “skilled metal and electrical trades”.8 
                                                        
7 In Table 1, we use all available observations for each variable to compute summary statistics. 
Analogous tables that compute summary statistics based on the smaller subsamples on which the 
multivariate statistical models are estimated closely match Table 1. 
8 These include (at the three-digit level) metal forming, welding, and related trades; metal machining, 
fitting, and instrument making trades; vehicle trades; and electrical trades. 
 14
For this group the incremental effect of an increase in Volatility from 0 to 1 is 
associated with a decrease of 45 percentage points (z=-2.79) in the probability that 
no multiskilling is used in the establishment’s largest occupational group. Because 
the relationship between volatility and multiskilling is strongly positive for this 
small group and negative for the remainder of the sample, pooling all observations 
would misleadingly mask this stark difference. For this reason, in the subsequent 
analysis we exclude this small group of establishments while clearly acknowledging 
that our theory cannot explain the result for this group.9 Excluding only those 78 
establishments from the sample and re-estimating our model yields the results in 
the second column of Table 2. The main result is significantly strengthened in both 
an economic and statistical sense (the incremental effect increases from 7.5 percent 
to 10.8 percent with a z-statistic of 2.12, so the percent increase in the probability 
that multiskilling is not used increases from 19 percent to 27.3 percent). 
 The fundamental tradeoff underlying our theoretical model of multiskilling is 
the benefit of flexibility versus the cost of having workers who are “jacks-of-all-
trades and masters of none”. We formalize this idea by developing a model of a two-
product production process, suggesting that our empirical analysis should also be 
based on multi-product firms. The survey allows us to stratify our sample based on 
“single product” versus “multi-product”.10 Table 3 displays ordered probit results 
for the multi-skilling model. Column 1 is for multi-product establishments and 
column 2 is for single-product establishments. Consistent with our theoretical 
model, the main empirical result is strengthened in the multi-product subsample 
                                                        
9 In a modified version of our model, if this group were characterized by higher per-worker training 
costs for multi-skilled workers than for specialists, and if k = α so that the productivity perspective 
vanishes from the model, then the firm would hire specialists for sufficiently small α and would 
otherwise hire multiskilled labor, thereby explaining the result for this group. Intuitively, the reason 
why the firm’s likelihood of multiskilling in this case would be increasing in α is that the advantage to 
the firm of being able to allocate all of its labor to the more profitable good is increasing in the 
expected profitability of the most profitable good (i.e. the expected value of the maximum order 
statistic is increasing in the variance of the underlying distribution), and this advantage would 
ultimately overwhelm the higher training costs for multi-skilled workers. While we note this as a 
theoretical possibility, we do not emphasize the point given that k = α is an extreme parameterization 
and that is unclear why it would apply to this group (and only this group). 
10 The survey question is: “Is the output of this establishment concentrated on one product or service 
or are there several different products or services?” Responses are either “Single product or service” 
or “Different products or services”. 
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(versus the full sample) and it disappears in the single-product subsample. In the 
multi-product sample (column 2), the incremental effect on the probability of no 
multiskilling is 0.175 (z=2.78) which, from a base probability of 0.34, implies an 
increase of 51.5 percent in the probability of no multiskilling. In the single-product 
sample (column 4), the incremental effect is only 0.013 and is far from statistically 
significant (z=0.16). We view the subsample in column 2 of Table 3 as the preferred 
subsample for empirically testing our theoretical model.  
 The literature on job design (both theoretical and empirical) has focused 
heavily on the manufacturing sector since its inception. Yet, in the 2004 British 
WERS, as seen in Table 1, less than 13 percent of the establishments are in 
manufacturing.11 Given that the manufacturing sector has declined over time and is 
now small (relative to the entire economy) in most developed economies, it is 
particularly interesting to address our research question in the non-manufacturing 
sector as well as in manufacturing. Recall that the tradeoff between the flexibility 
and productivity that we model in Section 2 is applicable to a wide range of goods, 
services, and sectors in the economy. 
 Table 4 displays results of our model in multi-product establishments for a 
manufacturing subsample (column 1) and a non-manufacturing subsample (column 
2). In manufacturing, the incremental effect of Volatility on the probability of no 
multiskilling is 0.393 (z = 2.50), with a base probability of 0.23, implying a 169 
percent increase in the probability of no multiskilling. In non-manufacturing, the 
incremental effect is 0.159 (z = 2.24), with a base probability of 0.346, implying a 46 
percent increase in the probability of no multiskilling. While the estimates suggest 
that evidence of our main result is stronger in manufacturing than outside, the 
                                                        
11 While the manufacturing sector is relatively small overall, and declining, Eriksson and Ortega 
(2006) note that broad job designs (i.e. job rotation) are more prevalent in the manufacturing sector 
than outside it, so it is reasonable to question how important our research question is outside the 
context of manufacturing. We find in the WERS data that multiskilling is more prevalent in 
manufacturing than outside of manufacturing, though the difference is not dramatic. More precisely, 
the distribution of establishments across the seven multiskilling categories [recalling that 1=“None 
(0%)”; 2=“Just a few (1-19%)”; 3=“Some (20-39%)”; 4=“Around half (40-59%)”; 5=“Most (60-79%)”; 
6=“Almost all (80-99%)”; 7=“All (100%)” ] is (0.33, 0.16, 0.15, 0.07, 0.09, 0.07, 0.13) for 
manufacturing and (0.41, 0.19, 0.12, 0.09, 0.04, 0.04, 0.11) for non-manufacturing. 
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important point is that the result is clearly present in both sectors and that it is both 
economically and statistically significant. 
 To summarize our results, we find that higher product market volatility is 
associated with less multiskilling (i.e. more specialization) for most firms in our 
sample, consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model for most plausible 
parameter values. This result exists for multi-product establishments but not for 
single-product establishments, also consistent with our theoretical model. The 
result goes in the opposite direction (i.e. higher volatility is associated with more 
multiskilling) for a small set of establishments for which “skilled metal and electrical 
trades” is the largest occupational group. We also find that the main result is not 
specific to manufacturing; it is clearly present in both manufacturing and non-
manufacturing subsamples.    
 
IV. DISCUSSION AND FURTHER ANALYSIS 
 Some natural extensions arise from synthesizing our findings with the 
existing literature on multiskilling. In this section we discuss some of these 
extensions, providing additional empirical evidence, and then turn to a more general 
discussion of our approach and findings and how they relate to the existing 
literature. 
Morita (2005) notes that firms employing continuous process improvement 
need workers who understand the production process beyond a narrow area of 
specialization. Job rotation provides workers with the broad understanding needed 
to contribute productivity-enhancing ideas to management.12 Furthermore, when 
firms provide workers with a large amount of firm-specific human capital, those 
workers become less subject to poaching by other firms, reinforcing the returns to 
training investments made by the firm through job rotation (Morita 2001, 2005).  
Combining Morita’s model with an assumption about how continuous 
process improvement varies with product market volatility offers a potential 
alternative explanation for our main empirical result. In particular, it can be argued 
                                                        
12 Gibbs et al. (2007) make a similar point when they argue that “combining interdependent tasks in 
a job may enable the worker to learn process improvements.” 
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that the returns to continuous process improvement are higher when the product 
market is more stable. When the product market is stable, process improvements, 
which Morita (2001) defines as involving “a number of small changes and 
modifications,” yield dividends for many periods into the future. By contrast, in a 
volatile market, dividends from small improvements are short lived because heavily 
modified (or entirely new) processes are required with high frequency.13 Thus, one 
might expect that increased product-market volatility would reduce the incentive 
for employers to engage in continuous process improvement and hence job rotation 
(and multiskilling, which is a necessary prerequisite to job rotation).  
To verify whether employers engage less in process improvement practices 
in the face of product-market volatility, we estimate an empirical model of the role 
of product-market volatility in determining whether establishments employ quality 
circles.14 We estimate a probit model using a dummy variable for the use of quality 
circles (=1 if the establishment uses quality circles) as the dependent variable and 
product-market volatility as an independent variable, including the same controls as 
in our previous specifications. Estimates of this model are given in Table 5. The 
coefficient on Volatility is negative and statistically significant, providing evidence 
that a highly volatile product market is indeed associated with less continuous 
process improvement. Quantitatively, volatility is associated with a decrease of 7.6 
percentage points (or 53 percent) in the probability that quality circles are used.  
This evidence empirically supports the assumption that, when combined with 
Morita’s model, could potentially explain the main empirical result in Table 2. 
However, in contrast to the model of Section II, the alternative explanation would 
appear to apply equally well to single-product and multi-product establishments, 
whereas in Table 3 we find a stark difference between these two types of 
                                                        
13 For example, volatility in the product market might reflect rapidly changing consumer tastes with 
respect to the quality or type of product or service demanded. Thus, today’s process for producing a 
good or service of a particular type and quality level might become obsolete if the product is 
demanded at a different quality level or with different specifications tomorrow, as would be true in a 
volatile product market with unpredictable and rapidly changing consumer tastes.  
14 Our use of quality circles as a measure of continuous process improvement is motivated by Koike 
(1988) and Morita (2005), who both cite quality circles as essential features of continuous process 
improvement.  
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establishments (with the result holding strongly in multi-product establishments 
but disappearing in single-product establishments).15 Our reading of Table 3 is that 
the single-product versus multi-product distinction is likely an important 
component to explaining why the degree of multiskilling versus specialization varies 
as it does with product market volatility.   
A number of studies address the impact of multiskilling on worker 
incentives. For example, Carmichael and MacLeod (1993) note that workers often 
possess information about the best ways to adopt technological change that is 
unavailable to owners. Workers, in some cases, fear that labor-displacing 
technological change will make them redundant and so have an incentive to hide 
this information from owners. By multiskilling workers, firms can credibly commit 
to retain workers in one task, should they be made redundant in another. This 
improves incentives for workers to facilitate adoption of technological change. 
Carmichael and MacLeod’s theory suggests an additional cost to specializing 
workers not taken into account in our model. Alternatively, our empirical finding 
suggests that product-market volatility may shift risk from firms to workers by 
limiting the willingness of firms to offer workers insurance against job loss (in the 
form of multiskilling). 
Owan (2001) argues that multiskilling workers makes worker skills 
substitutable by creating task overlap. This substitutability creates competition 
between workers, which provides an incentive for workers to acquire firm specific 
human capital. 
Ortega (2001) argues that job rotation allows management to observe 
employee-position matches and thus better optimize matching of workers to jobs. 
Eriksson and Ortega (2006) provide empirical evidence in support of this claim.  
Ortega (2001) predicts that there will be more job rotation when there is less prior 
information about employees' abilities and about the profitability of different jobs. 
                                                        
15 When we estimated the model of Table 5 on the subsample of single-product establishments, we 
found essentially the same result as in the sample of multi-product establishments. In particular, 
volatility is associated with a decrease of 5.7 percentage points (or 52 percent) in the probability that 
quality circles are used. However, precision was somewhat lower in this smaller subsample (560 
observations versus 773) and statistical significance is attained at the ten percent level only on a one-
tailed test (Z = 1.56). 
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The firm will use job rotation to learn what the optimal worker-job matches are, 
when faced with imperfect information about which jobs are more profitable or 
which employees are better at them. Although Ortega does not explicitly address 
volatility in the product market, it might be argued that with higher levels of 
volatility, the firm has less information about the profitability of different jobs and 
will therefore use more job rotation (i.e. less specialization). This result runs 
counter to our model’s prediction and to the empirical evidence we present.  
 A number of papers discuss the fact that multiskilling facilitates coordination 
between production units. Hart and Moore (2005) argue that optimal hierarchies 
will tend to place specialists at the bottom of an organizational pyramid and 
coordinators (with broader understanding) higher up. Multiskilled workers tend to 
be managers in their paper and hence its applicability to our work (which focuses 
on multiskilling by core production workers) is limited. Dessein and Santos (2006) 
argue that firms face a tradeoff between adaptation and coordination.16 When firms 
give workers the flexibility to respond to local (hence unobservable to management) 
information, this improves adaptation, but at a cost of coordination. Firms can 
multiskill workers to improve coordination, though at a productivity cost.   
Dessein and Santos predict that “organizations reduce the division of labor as 
the business environment becomes more uncertain.” While our model and empirical 
results support the opposite contention, it is possible their argument plays a role in 
the different findings we obtain for single- versus multi-product firms. Arguably the 
relative importance of coordination versus adaptation is greater for single-product 
firms, as all workers are producing the same product. By contrast, in a multi-product 
firm workers on different products may have no need to coordinate with each other 
across products,17 thus the relative importance of coordination versus adaptation is 
likely to be diminished. Recalling that we control for firm size in our empirical 
analysis, our finding that product market volatility leads to less multiskilling for 
multi-product firms but that volatility has no effect on multiskilling for single-
                                                        
16 The same tradeoff features in Kato and Owan (2010). 
17 Managers, purchasers, and salespeople may need to coordinate across products, but recall that our 
analysis is of core production workers. 
 20
product firms is consistent with the notion that returns to coordination (and hence 
multiskilling) may be greater for single-product firms. 
Other benefits of a broad job design cited by past authors include 
productivity gains from task complementarities (Lindbeck and Snower, 2000; 
Boucekkine and Crifo, 2008); improved communication within and between work 
units and between workers and management (Aoki, 1986; Morita, 2001 and 2005; 
Wang, 2002); improved incentives for workers (Itoh, 1994); and contribution to 
learning by workers and remedy against worker boredom (Lindbeck and Snower, 
2000). 
In the introduction, we noted that the key theoretical contributions of our 
paper are 1) addressing the role of product market volatility in the firm’s decision to 
multiskill workers, 2) highlighting productivity gains to specialization; 3) 
highlighting gains from multiskilling in the form of flexible labor allocation; and 4) 
drawing a link between specialization and increased product innovation by 
workers. 
Regarding the second of these contributions, much of the existing literature 
considers the main return to specialization to be lower training costs (e.g. 
Carmichael and MacLeod, 1993, Garg, et al., 2002, Wang, 2002, and Morita, 2005). 
Exceptions that note productivity gains to specialization are Cosgel and Miceli 
(1999), Lindbeck and Snower (2000) and Boucekkine and Crifo (2008). Given that 
the intuition held by most economists since Adam Smith is that specialization brings 
greater productivity, we feel it is important to include a more substantial form of 
returns to specialization in models of multiskilling. 
Regarding the third contribution, while a common intuition about the benefit 
of multiskilling is that it provides flexibility in labor allocation, very little of the 
existing literature actually focuses on this point. Garg, et al (2002) come closest to 
our interpretation of the benefits of multiskilling by arguing that the practice gives 
firms increased flexibility in responding to demand variability. In Garg, et al, firms 
can reduce inventories of finished goods needed to satisfy customer orders by 
multiskilling workers so that workers can be shifted to more quickly address 
production bottlenecks. Firms therefore trade off costly inventories against higher 
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training costs in choosing to multiskill workers. It should be noted that Garg’s model 
does not apply to service firms and other firms that cannot keep inventories of 
finished goods. 
Regarding the fourth contribution, in our model multiskilling brings 
flexibility in production, but at the cost of a productivity advantage associated with 
the ability of specialized workers to innovate. This productivity advantage interacts 
in a crucial way with volatility in the product market. Specialized workers can 
innovate quickly in response to sudden changes in market conditions in ways that 
multiskilled workers cannot. Our assumption that multiskilled workers cannot 
respond as adeptly to changing market conditions as specialized workers can 
warrants discussion in light of the past literature.  
In particular, Koike (1985), Aoki (1986) and Morita (2005) make reference 
to the enhanced ability of multiskilled workers to respond to “emergent events” on 
the production line in a manufacturing context. These include emergencies such as 
equipment breakdowns, inventory imbalances, and nascent product flaws. Morita 
(2005), for example, argues that “multiply skilled employees can make better 
decisions than single skilled employees concerning how to cope with irregular and 
emergent events.” Wang (2001) makes a similar assumption, in arguing that 
multiskilled workers can coordinate better with other work units to correct product 
misspecifications. These authors argue that multiskilled workers respond better to 
uncertain events, while we argue that specialized workers respond better to 
uncertain events. 
This appears, on the surface, to be a contradiction. However, we argue that it 
is not. The “emergent events” to which Koike, Aoki, and Morita refer are unexpected 
events occurring on the production floor—production line volatility. Clearly 
multiskilled workers provide a potential advantage over specialized workers when 
something like a machine breakdown occurs because the multiskilled worker on 
that machine may be able to quickly repair it without calling in a manager or 
specialized repair person. In examples like this, the key return to multiskilling is 
flexibility to respond to problems that arise with uncertainty in the otherwise well-
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defined production of an unchanging product. We can think of this as process 
innovation. 
By contrast, our assumption that it is specialized workers who respond better 
to uncertain events pertains to a different source of uncertainty—volatility in the 
product market. In our model, this uncertainty is faced by a multiproduct (or 
multiservice) firm, not necessarily in manufacturing. In the case of product market 
volatility, it seems reasonable to assume that a jack-of-all-trades worker will be less 
capable of adapting a product to changing consumer whims than a specialized 
worker who is a trained expert in that product. When it comes to product 
innovation, specialists in those products or services are likely to do a better job than 
generalists. 
The distinction that we draw between our model assumptions and those of 
Koike, Aoki, and Morita is very similar to that drawn by Carmichael and MacLeod 
(1993). They note that “multiskilling firms will exhibit a comparative advantage in 
'process' style innovation, which makes it possible to produce given products more 
cheaply, while single skilling firms will be relatively better suited to 'product' 
innovations such as the development of entirely new commodities.” In our model, 
positive values of I can be interpreted as product innovations demanded by 
consumers, and by our assumptions, such innovations are best captured by product 
experts—specialized workers.  
In our model, as in Koike, Aoki, Wang, and Morita, multiskilling provides a 
form of flexibility that cannot be provided by specialized workers. In all these 
models, firms face a tradeoff between flexibility advantages of multiskilling and 
some advantage to specialization. The most fundamental difference between our 
model and those of Koike, Aoki, Wang, and Morita, therefore, is our incorporation of 
productivity gains resulting from the increased ability to innovate associated with 
specialization. 
 Relatively little empirical work has been done to date to confirm or refute the 
various theories explaining multiskilling. Simons and Berri (2009) examine the 
returns to specialization among NFL running backs who perform two primary 
tasks—rushing and receiving. They find evidence that among players in the top half 
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of the salary distribution there are higher returns to specialization in one of those 
tasks than to versatility.18 Carstensen (2002) tests some of the Lindbeck and Snower 
hypotheses using firm-level data from Germany and finds marginally statistically 
significant support for some of their hypotheses. Eriksson and Ortega (2006) 
provide empirical tests of three alternative hypotheses for job rotation: 1) that 
rotation is useful for employee learning; 2) that rotation is useful for employer 
learning about job matches; and 3) that rotation keeps workers motivated. Using a 
Danish data set, they reject the worker motivation hypothesis but provide empirical 
support for the employee learning and employer learning hypotheses.  
Our work contributes to the empirical literature on job design in three ways. 
First, we test a new theory of multiskilling and provide empirical results consistent 
with that model and with the existing theoretical literature. Second, we introduce a 
new stylized fact to the job design literature—that higher levels of product market 
volatility are associated with less multiskilling. Third, we contribute to the 
broadening of the empirical job design literature beyond manufacturing, a sector 
that has long been in relative decline in most developed economies. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 In this paper we introduced a new stylized fact into the job design literature, 
namely that multiskilling is more prevalent when the degree of product market 
volatility is low. The result holds both inside and outside of the manufacturing 
sector, and it holds only for multi-product (or multi-service) establishments and not 
for single-product ones. This is the first paper to study how job design varies with 
the degree of volatility in the product market. Apart from being a novel question and 
uncovering a new stylized fact, the focus on volatility offers a useful mechanism for 
deepening our understanding of the firm’s decision to multiskill versus specialize its 
workers, which is a central and fundamental question in job design. To further that 
aim, we proposed a new theory that explains the empirical relationship between 
                                                        
18 The idea of players making split-second strategic readjustments in a complex environment 
matches well with the notion underlying our model that specialization enhances innovation. Thus 
this empirical finding could be interpreted as corroborating our results. 
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product market volatility and the degree of multiskilling. At the heart of the theory 
is a tradeoff between the benefits of flexibility in labor allocation (which is offered 
by multiskilled workers) and the benefits of intensive expertise in product lines 
(which is offered by specialized workers as opposed to multiskilled workers who, 
while flexible, are “jacks of all trades and masters of none”).  
 Much of the job design literature derives from a comparison of work 
practices in Japan versus those in the United States, especially in the 1980s when 
Japanese manufacturing was ascendant. A common theme from that literature is 
that the more “flexible” and “innovative” (e.g. Osterman, 1994) work practices of 
Japan are superior to those in the US. Yet, our findings suggest that while 
multiskilling may be good for cost-cutting and other forms of process innovation, 
specialization may yield important advantages for product innovation. This is 
consistent with the commonly held notion that Asian manufacturers are better than 
the West at producing products cheaply, but less good at inventing new products. 
Thus, our findings suggest a note of caution to firms rushing to embrace 
multiskilling.  
More generally, we feel that a fruitful and underexplored area of research is 
how product market conditions and the internal labor market interact to shape job 
design and the firm’s policy with respect to its human resource management 
practices. This paper offers one example of what new insights can be gained from 
such an exploration. 
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FIGURE 1: Incidence of Multiskilling Among WERS Establishments 
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Fractions Mean Standard 
Error 
Multiskilling    
1 = “None (0%)” 0.397   
2 = “Just a few (1-19%)” 0.178   
3 = “Some (20-39%)” 0.132   
4 = “Around half (40-59%)” 0.092   
5 = “Most (60-79%)”  0.050   
6 = “Almost all (80-99%)” 0.045   
7 = “All (100%)” 0.106   
Volatility  0.169 0.015 
Establishment size  27.266 0.902 
Union  0.211 0.015 
Fraction of Part Time Workers  0.322 0.012 
Fraction of Temporary Workers  0.018 0.004 
Percent Union  8.804 0.843 
Number of Recognized Unions  0.161 0.014 
Owner Manager  0.278 0.018 
Foreign Owned  0.105 0.012 
Establishment is at least 5 years old  0.882 0.014 
Franchise  0.029 0.006 
Fixed Term Percentage  4.862 0.653 
Fixed Term  0.170 0.013 
Temporary Workers  0.100 0.010 
Private  0.986 0.005 
Industry:    
  Manufacturing  0.125 0.014 
  Electricity, Gas, and Water  0.001 0.0003 
  Construction  0.053 0.009 
  Wholesale and Retail  0.291 0.019 
  Hotels and Restaurants  0.101 0.012 
  Transport and Communication  0.054 0.009 
  Financial Services  0.060 0.009 
  Other Business Services  0.157 0.014 
  Public Administration  0.0005 0.0002 
  Education  0.011 0.003 
  Health  0.092 0.010 
  Other Community Services  0.054 0.008 
Largest Occupational Group at Workplace:    
  Professionals  0.039 0.007 
  Associate Professional and Technical  0.074 0.010 
  Administrative and Secretarial Occupations  0.120 0.013 
  Skilled Trades  0.111 0.013 
  Caring, leisure, and personal service  0.081 0.010 
  Sales and customer service  0.275 0.018 
  Process, Plant and Machine Operatives and Drivers  0.134 0.014 
  Routine Unskilled  0.166 0.015 
Quality Circles  0.158 0.013 
Training Days    
  1 = “No time” 0.280   
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  2 = “Less than one day” 0.044   
  3 = “1 to less than 2 days” 0.200   
  4 = “2 to less than 5 days” 0.264   
  5 = “5 to less than 10 days” 0.104   
  6 = “10 days or more” 0.107   
Sample Size = 1622    
Note: Statistics are computed on the full sample, excluding observations for which Volatility is unobserved. 
Due to missing values, the sample size varies across variables; all non-missing observations were used to 
compute each statistic. Summary statistics based on the analysis subsample are available upon request and are 
similar to those reported here. 
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TABLE 2: Multiskilling and Product Market Volatility (ordered probit) 
Dependent Variable: Multiskilling (1=low, 7=high) 
 
Full Sample 
Excluding “Skilled metal 
and electrical trades” 
Volatility -0.193 (0.126) -0.276 (0.129) 
Establishment size 0.0001 (0.0002) 0.0001 (0.0002) 
Union -0.074 (0.173) 0.005 (0.176) 
Fraction of Part Time Workers -0.206 (0.211) -0.220 (0.215) 
Fraction of Temporary Workers -0.106 (0.173) -0.120 (0.173) 
Percent Union -0.0001 (0.003) -0.0005 (0.003) 
Number of Recognized Unions 0.251 (0.121) 0.231 (0.120) 
Owner Manager -0.077 (0.124) -0.068 (0.130) 
Foreign Owned 0.113 (0.165) 0.148 (0.170) 
Establishment is at least 5 years old  0.022 (0.161) -0.038 (0.168) 
Franchise -0.029 (0.222) -0.207 (0.243) 
Fixed Term Percentage -0.003 (0.004) -0.002 (0.004) 
Fixed Term 0.219 (0.144) 0.200 (0.148) 
Temporary Workers -0.325 (0.141) -0.333 (0.144) 
Private -0.230 (0.387) -0.261 (0.379) 
Industry:   
  Electricity, Gas, and Water -0.376 (0.260) -0.458 (0.267) 
  Construction -0.595 (0.224) -0.331 (0.260) 
  Wholesale and Retail -0.396 (0.202) -0.460 (0.217) 
  Hotels and Restaurants -0.466 (0.265) -0.421 (0.277) 
  Transport and Communication -0.638 (0.266) -0.654 (0.272) 
  Financial Services -0.041 (0.261) -0.074 (0.263) 
  Other Business Services -0.387 (0.222) -0.408 (0.232) 
  Public Administration -1.107 (0.489) -1.142 (0.491) 
  Education -0.205 (0.339) -0.270 (0.341) 
  Health -0.469 (0.263) -0.483 (0.268) 
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  Other Community Services -0.268 (0.257) -0.253 (0.262) 
Largest Occupational Group at 
Workplace: 
  
  Administrative and Secretarial 
Occupations 
0.307 (0.207) 0.313 (0.207) 
  Skilled Trades -0.273 (0.243) -0.733 (0.280) 
  Caring, leisure, and personal service 0.282 (0.229) 0.262 (0.228) 
  Sales and customer service 0.202 (0.220) 0.238 (0.221) 
  Process, Plant and Machine Operatives 
and Drivers 
0.058 (0.237) 0.056 (0.238) 
  Routine Unskilled 0.395 (0.236) 0.350 (0.237) 
Ordered Probit Cutoffs   
Cutoff 1 -0.759 (0.475) -0.872 (0.475) 
Cutoff 2 -0.296 (0.476) -0.388 (0.475) 
Cutoff 3 0.073 (0.476) -0.030 (0.475) 
Cutoff 4 0.379 (0.477) 0.276 (0.477) 
Cutoff 5 0.574 (0.480) 0.467 (0.479) 
Cutoff 6 0.809 (0.486) 0.688 (0.485) 
Incremental Effect of Volatility on:   
Prob(Multiskilling = 1) “None 0%” 0.075 (0.049) 
[0.396] 
0.108 (0.051) 
[0.395] 
Prob(Multiskilling = 2)  -0.001 (0.003) 
[0.182] 
-0.004 (0.005) 
[0.191] 
Prob(Multiskilling = 3)  -0.011 (0.008) 
[0.136] 
-0.017 (0.009) 
[0.132] 
Prob(Multiskilling = 4)  -0.013 (0.009) 
[0.094] 
-0.019 (0.009) 
[0.093] 
Prob(Multiskilling = 5)  -0.009 (0.006) 
[0.049] 
-0.013 (0.006) 
[0.047] 
Prob(Multiskilling = 6)  -0.010 (0.007) 
[0.047] 
-0.014 (0.007) 
[0.044] 
Prob(Multiskilling = 7) “All (100%)” -0.030 (0.018) -0.042 (0.018) 
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[0.096] [0.098] 
Sample Size 1407 1329 
Note: Cell entries are ordered probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses beside each estimate. Incremental effects 
at the bottom of the table give the change in the predicted probability of Multiskilling = k (for k = 1,2,…,7) when Volatility 
increases from 0 to 1, evaluating other covariates at their means. For the incremental effects at the bottom of the table, the 
numbers in square brackets, [], are the baseline probabilities for the corresponding row title. Dummy variable omitted 
categories are “Professionals” and “Associate professional and technical” for the establishment’s largest occupational group, 
and “Manufacturing” for industry.  
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TABLE 3: Multiskilling and Product Market Volatility (Multi-Product vs. Single-
Product Establishments) (ordered probit)  
Dependent Variable: Multiskilling (1=low, 7=high) 
 Multi-Product Establishments Single-Product Establishments 
 
Full Sample 
Excluding 
“Skilled metal 
and electrical 
trades” 
Full Sample 
Excluding 
“Skilled metal 
and electrical 
trades” 
Volatility -0.261 (0.161) -0.456 (0.160) -0.065 (0.201) -0.032 (0.205) 
Establishment size 0.0001 (0.0003) 0.0001 (0.0003) 0.0003 (0.0003) 0.0003 (0.0003) 
Union -0.029 (0.247) 0.173 (0.244) 0.060 (0.263) 0.058 (0.264) 
Fraction of Part Time Workers 0.215 (0.321) 0.194 (0.328) -0.775 (0.283) -0.772 (0.285) 
Fraction of Temporary Workers -0.034 (0.098) -0.048 (0.096) -1.626 (0.997) -1.609 (1.000) 
Percent Union 0.003 (0.004) 0.0001 (0.004) -0.003 (0.006) -0.003 (0.006) 
Number of Recognized Unions 0.231 (0.154) 0.197 (0.156) 0.125 (0.155) 0.126 (0.157) 
Owner Manager 0.187 (0.163) 0.211 (0.172) -0.367 (0.195) -0.353 (0.198) 
Foreign Owned 0.272 (0.204) 0.286 (0.209) -0.196 (0.261) -0.165 (0.265) 
Establishment is at least 5 years 
old  
-0.055 (0.236) -0.077 (0.245) 0.101 (0.218) 0.049 (0.226) 
Franchise -0.588 (0.312) -0.683 (0.311) 0.437 (0.280) 0.262 (0.346) 
Fixed Term Percentage 0.001 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005) -0.008 (0.005) -0.008 (0.005) 
Fixed Term 0.205 (0.175) 0.187 (0.184) 0.227 (0.255) 0.234 (0.256) 
Temporary Workers -0.315 (0.184) -0.313 (0.192) -0.061 (0.214) -0.068 (0.215) 
Private -0.148 (0.448) -0.177 (0.441) -0.249 (0.524) -0.249 (0.520) 
Industry:     
  Electricity, Gas, and Water -0.729 (0.413) -0.361 (0.483) 0.088 (0.354) -0.150 (0.389) 
  Construction -0.429 (0.275) -0.079 (0.307) -0.821 (0.381) -0.629 (0.424) 
  Wholesale and Retail -0.405 (0.257) -0.520 (0.269) -0.404 (0.354) -0.320 (0.398) 
  Hotels and Restaurants -0.506 (0.390) -0.501 (0.400) -0.397 (0.429) -0.313 (0.451) 
  Transport and Communication -0.454 (0.359) -0.487 (0.379) -0.798 (0.361) -0.749 (0.374) 
  Financial Services -0.094 (0.310) -0.151 (0.317) -0.389 (0.510) -0.377 (0.518) 
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  Other Business Services -0.140 (0.272) -0.151 (0.283) -0.562 (0.419) -0.556 (0.444) 
  Public Administration -0.878 (0.608) -0.887 (0.639) -1.318 (0.630) -1.323 (0.640) 
  Education 0.019 (0.422) -0.162 (0.422) -1.075 (0.475) -1.042 (0.492) 
  Health -0.101 (0.373) -0.165 (0.378) -0.510 (0.425) -0.469 (0.444) 
  Other Community Services -0.222 (0.355) -0.249 (0.359) -0.289 (0.391) -0.225 (0.413) 
Largest Occupational Group at 
Workplace: 
    
  Administrative and Secretarial 
Occupations 
0.461 (0.270) 0.491 (0.272) 0.133 (0.302) 0.138 (0.303) 
  Skilled Trades -0.112 (0.323) -0.831 (0.374) -0.548 (0.374) -0.687 (0.426) 
  Caring, leisure, and personal 
service 
0.289 (0.346) 0.244 (0.349) 0.351 (0.294) 0.340 (0.292) 
  Sales and customer service 0.228 (0.292) 0.284 (0.295) 0.233 (0.310) 0.202 (0.313) 
  Process, Plant and Machine 
Operatives and Drivers 
0.254 (0.292) 0.242 (0.294) -0.092 (0.369) -0.123 (0.370) 
  Routine Unskilled 0.560 (0.347) 0.520 (0.351) 0.371 (0.318) 0.325 (0.316) 
Ordered Probit Cutoffs     
Cutoff 1 -0.450 (0.581) -0.556 (0.582) -1.001 (0.718) -1.004 (0.733) 
Cutoff 2 -0.003 (0.582) -0.076 (0.582) -0.480 (0.712) -0.474 (0.726) 
Cutoff 3 0.364 (0.581) 0.286 (0.582) -0.074 (0.711) -0.088 (0.726) 
Cutoff 4 0.654 (0.584) 0.577 (0.586) 0.296 (0.707) 0.280 (0.721) 
Cutoff 5 0.870 (0.587) 0.793 (0.589) 0.472 (0.710) 0.446 (0.723) 
Cutoff 6 1.113 (0.595) 1.014 (0.597) 0.719 (0.713) 0.695 (0.726) 
Incremental Effect of 
Volatility on: 
    
Prob(Multiskilling = 1) 
“None (0%)” 
0.099 (0.062) 
[0.341] 
0.175 (0.063) 
[0.340] 
0.026 (0.080) 
[0.468] 
0.013 (0.081) 
[0.464] 
Prob(Multiskilling = 2)  0.004 (0.003) 
[0.174] 
0.001 (0.007) 
[0.187] 
-0.003 (0.009) 
[0.202] 
-0.001 (0.008) 
[0.206] 
Prob(Multiskilling = 3)  -0.011 (0.009) 
[0.142] 
-0.024 (0.012) 
[0.139] 
-0.005 (0.017) 
[0.131] 
-0.003 (0.016) 
[0.126] 
Prob(Multiskilling = 4)  -0.016 (0.010) 
[0.099] 
-0.029 (0.011) 
[0.098] 
-0.006 (0.018) 
[0.087] 
-0.003 (0.018) 
[0.088] 
Prob(Multiskilling = 5)  -0.013 (0.009) -0.023 (0.009) -0.003 (0.008) -0.001 (0.008) 
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[0.062] [0.061] [0.030] [0.029] 
Prob(Multiskilling = 6)  -0.015 (0.009) 
[0.057] 
-0.023 (0.009) 
[0.051] 
-0.003 (0.009) 
[0.031] 
-0.002 (0.010) 
[0.033] 
Prob(Multiskilling = 7)  
“All (100%)” 
-0.048 (0.028) 
[0.124] 
-0.077 (0.025) 
[0.124] 
-0.007 (0.020) 
[0.051] 
-0.003 (0.022) 
[0.054] 
Sample Size 812 767 594 561 
Note: Cell entries are ordered probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses beside each estimate.  Incremental 
effects at the bottom of the table give the change in the predicted probability of Multiskilling = k (for k = 1,2,…,7) when 
Volatility increases from 0 to 1, evaluating other covariates at their means.  For the incremental effects at the bottom of the 
table, the numbers in square brackets, [], are the baseline probabilities for the corresponding row title.  Dummy variable 
omitted categories are “Professionals” and “Associate professional and technical” for the establishment’s largest occupational 
group, and “Manufacturing” for industry.  
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TABLE 4: Multiskilling and Product Market Volatility (Manufacturing vs. Non-
Manufacturing) (ordered probit) 
Dependent Variable: Multiskilling (1=low, 7=high) 
 Manufacturing Non-manufacturing 
Volatility -1.091 (0.423) -0.415 (0.180) 
Establishment size -0.001 (0.001) 0.0001 (0.0003) 
Union -0.044 (0.683) 0.079 (0.265) 
Fraction of Part Time Workers -1.710 (3.372) 0.149 (0.317) 
Fraction of Temporary Workers -4.711 (2.132) -0.017 (0.072) 
Percent Union 0.004 (0.013) 0.002 (0.004) 
Number of Recognized Unions -0.316 (0.313) 0.281 (0.183) 
Owner Manager 0.441 (0.492) 0.177 (0.180) 
Foreign Owned 1.001 (0.455) 0.132 (0.222) 
Establishment is at least 5 years old 1.907 (0.438) -0.356 (0.244) 
Franchise 1.255 (0.453) -0.826 (0.390) 
Fixed Term Percentage -0.048 (0.020) 0.004 (0.004) 
Fixed Term 1.237 (0.496) 0.057 (0.197) 
Temporary Workers -0.029 (0.339) -0.203 (0.194) 
Private -1.651 (1.269) 0.008 (0.358) 
Largest Occupational Group at 
Workplace: 
  
  Administrative and Secretarial 
Occupations 
2.340 (0.458) 0.337 (0.267) 
  Skilled Trades 2.321 (0.608) -1.135 (0.319) 
  Caring, leisure, and personal service -- 0.112 (0.293) 
  Sales and customer service 0.460 (0.446) -0.019 (0.270) 
  Process, Plant and Machine Operatives 
and Drivers 
2.335 (0.407) -0.027 (0.314) 
  Routine Unskilled 3.275 (0.518) 0.169 (0.296) 
Ordered Probit Cutoffs   
Cutoff 1 1.429 (1.465) -0.549 (0.484) 
Cutoff 2 1.843 (1.443) -0.041 (0.485) 
Cutoff 3 2.698 (1.428) 0.295 (0.485) 
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Cutoff 4 2.890 (1.427) 0.609 (0.488) 
Cutoff 5 3.259 (1.433) 0.820 (0.493) 
Cutoff 6 3.667 (1.433) 1.029 (0.502) 
Incremental Effect of Volatility on:   
Prob(Multiskilling = 1) “None (0%)” 0.393 (0.157) 
[0.232] 
0.159 (0.071) 
[0.346] 
Prob(Multiskilling = 2) 0.020 (0.039) 
[0.143] 
-0.00002 (0.008) 
[0.199] 
Prob(Multiskilling = 3) -0.133 (0.080) 
[0.329] 
-0.021 (0.012) 
[0.128] 
Prob(Multiskilling = 4) -0.046 (0.021) 
[0.063] 
-0.029 (0.013) 
[0.104] 
Prob(Multiskilling = 5) -0.083 (0.053) 
[0.097] 
-0.021 (0.010) 
[0.058] 
Prob(Multiskilling = 6) -0.071 (0.041) 
[0.070] 
-0.020 (0.010) 
[0.047] 
Prob(Multiskilling = 7) “All (100%)” -0.081 (0.041) 
[0.066] 
-0.069 (0.027) 
[0.119] 
Sample Size 151 616 
Note: Cell entries are ordered probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses beside each estimate. Incremental effects 
at the bottom of the table give the change in the predicted probability of Multiskilling = k (for k = 1,2,…,7) when Volatility 
increases from 0 to 1, evaluating other covariates at their means. Dummy variable omitted category is “Professionals” and 
“Associate professional and technical” for the establishment’s largest occupational group. Dummy variable for largest 
occupational group of “caring, leisure, and personal service” dropped in the manufacturing subsample. Both samples are 
restricted to multi-product establishments and exclude establishments for which “skilled metal and electrical trades” is the 
largest occupational group. 
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TABLE 5: Probit results for Quality Circles and Volatility 
Dependent Variable: Quality Circles (1=yes, 0=no) 
Volatility -0.387 (0.196) 
Establishment size 0.001 (0.0004) 
Union 0.601 (0.291) 
Fraction of Part Time Workers 0.285 (0.362) 
Fraction of Temporary Workers -0.083 (0.215) 
Percent Union -0.003 (0.006) 
Number of Recognized Unions 0.014 (0.200) 
Owner Manager -0.089 (0.211) 
Foreign Owned 0.066 (0.232) 
Establishment is at least 5 years old 0.113 (0.321) 
Franchise -0.165 (0.521) 
Fixed Term Percentage 0.002 (0.005) 
Fixed Term -0.020 (0.200) 
Temporary Workers 0.320 (0.216) 
Private 0.317 (0.687) 
Industry:  
  Manufacturing 0.547 (0.549) 
  Construction -0.255 (0.637) 
  Wholesale and Retail -0.646 (0.557) 
  Hotels and Restaurants -1.061 (0.735) 
  Transport and Communication -0.232 (0.642) 
  Financial Services -0.456 (0.555) 
  Other Business Services -0.241 (0.566) 
  Public Administration -0.137 (0.809) 
  Education -0.453 (0.640) 
  Health 0.112 (0.594) 
  Other Community Services -0.800 (0.969) 
Largest Occupational Group at 
Workplace: 
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  Administrative and Secretarial 
Occupations 
-0.086 (0.282) 
  Skilled Trades -1.123 (0.447) 
  Caring, leisure, and personal service -1.039 (0.464) 
  Sales and customer service -0.459 (0.307) 
  Process, Plant and Machine Operatives 
and Drivers 
-1.058 (0.303) 
  Routine Unskilled -0.483 (0.375) 
Constant -0.800 (0.969) 
Incremental Effect of Volatility on:  
Prob(Quality Circles = 1) -0.076 (0.033) 
[0.143] 
Sample Size 773 
Note: Cell entries are ordered probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses beside each  
estimate.  Incremental effects at the bottom of the table give the change in the predicted probability  
of Multiskilling = k (for k = 1,2,…,7) when Volatility increases from 0 to 1, evaluating other covariates  
at their means.  Dummy variable omitted categories are  “Professionals” and “Associate professional  
and technical” for the establishment’s largest occupational group, and “Electricity, gas, and water”  
for industry. Sample is restricted to multi-product establishments excluding those for which the  
largest occupational group is “skilled metal and electrical trades”.  
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APPENDIX: Variable Definitions 
 
Multiskilling = 1 if “None (0%)” 
           = 2 if “Just a few (1-19%)” 
           = 3 if “Some (20-39%)” 
           = 4 if “Around half (40-59%)” 
           = 5 if “Most (60-79%)” 
           = 6 if “Almost all (80-99%)” 
           = 7 if “All (100%)” 
 
Volatility = 1 if the current state of the market for the main product or service of the 
establishment is described as “turbulent” (= 0 if described as “growing”, “mature”, 
or “declining”) 
 
Establishment Size: number of workers at the establishment 
 
Union: dummy equaling 1 if there are any workers at the establishment are covered 
by a union (=0 otherwise) 
 
Fraction of Part Time Workers: fraction of part-time workers at the establishment 
 
Fraction of Temporary Workers: fraction of temporary workers at the establishment 
 
Percent Union: percentage of workers at the establishment covered by a union 
 
Number of Recognized Unions: (at the establishment) 
 
Owner Manager: dummy equaling 1 if there is an owner-manager (=0 otherwise) 
 
Foreign Owned: dummy equaling 1 if foreign owned (=0 otherwise) 
 
Establishment is at least 5 years old: dummy equaling 1 if this is true, (=0 otherwise) 
Franchise: dummy equaling 1 if establishment is a franchise (=0 otherwise) 
 
Fixed Term Percentage: percentage of workers on fixed term contracts at the 
establishment 
 
Fixed Term: dummy equaling 1 if any workers are on fixed-term contracts (=0 
otherwise) 
 
Temporary Workers: dummy equaling 1 if any temporary workers at the 
establishment (=0 otherwise) 
 
Private: dummy equaling 1 if private sector establishment (=0 otherwise) 
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Industry categories: (Manufacturing; Electricity, Gas, and Water; Construction; 
Wholesale and Retail; Hotels and Restaurants; Transport and Communication; 
Financial Services; Other Business Services; Public Administration; Education; 
Health; Other Community Services) 
 
Largest occupational group at the establishment categories: Professionals; Associate 
Professional and Technical; Administrative and Secretarial; Skilled Trades; Caring, 
leisure, and personal service; Sales and customer service; Process, Plant and 
Machine Operatives and Drivers; Routine Unskilled 
 
Quality Circles: dummy equaling 1 if affirmative response to: “Do you have groups of 
non-managerial employees at this workplace that solve specific problems or discuss 
aspects of performance or quality? They are sometimes known as problem-solving 
groups or quality circles or continuous improvement groups.” 
 
Training Days: number of days of training that experienced workers in the  
establishment’s largest occupational group had on average during the previous 12 
months (1 = “No time”, 2 = “Less than one day”, 3 = “1 to less than 2 days”, 4 = “2 to 
less than 5 days”, 5 = “5 to less than 10 days”, 6 = “10 days or more”) 
 
